

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACCP	Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police
BPA	Barbados Plan of Action
CANSEC	Caribbean National Security Conference of Chiefs
CCFLH	Council of Forensic Laboratories Heads
CCLEC	Caribbean Customs Law Enforcement Council
CCM	Caribbean Drug Control Coordination Mechanism
CFATF	Caribbean Financial Action Task Force
CHRC	Caribbean Harm Reduction Coalition
CICAD	Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission
CODAC	Community Development Action Council
COFCOR	Council for Foreign and Community Relations
COHSOD	Council for Human and Social Development
COTED	Council for Trade and Economic Development
DARE	Drug Abuse Resistance Education
DOH	Deutsch – Ordens Hospitalswerk
EAP	Employee Assistance Programmes
EMCDDA	European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
EULAC	European Union Latin America and the Caribbean
HFLE	Health and Family Life Education
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Country
IDER	Integrated Demand Reduction
IGTF	Inter – Governmental Task Force
LDC	Less Developed Countries
MDC	More Developed Countries
NA	Narcotics Anonymous
NADAPP	National Drug and Alcohol Abuse Prevention Programmes
NGO	Non – Governmental Organisation
NIDA	National Institute on Drug Abuse (US)
NJHQ	National Joint Headquarters
OAS	Organisation of American States
OCTRIS	Overseas Territories Regional Crime Intelligence System
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation in Development
OECS	Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
PMO	Project Management Office
ROCISS	Regional Organised Crime Intelligence Sharing Systems
PRIDE	Parents Resource Institute for Drug Education
RAMIT	Regional Anti-Crime Major Investment Team
RCM	Regional Co-ordinating Mechanism
RedTRAC	Regional Training Centre
RRRM	Regional Rapid Response Mechanism
RSS	Regional Security System
RTCG	Caribbean Regional Law enforcement Training Coordination Group
TCG	Training Co-ordinating Group
SOP	Standing Operating Procedure
SSA	Strategic Services Agency
UNDCP	United Nations International Drugs Control Programmes
UWI	University of the West Indies

PREFACE

In fulfilment of the mandate of the Thirteenth Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in Belize City, Belize in February 2002, the following Report is submitted for the consideration of the Conference of Heads of Government at its Twenty-Third Meeting in Georgetown, Guyana on 4 - 5 July 2002.

For convenience, a summary of the main recommendations has been included as part of the Executive Summary and in keeping with a further decision of the Thirteenth Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government, the Section on "Information and Intelligence" is presented under separate cover.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), at its Twenty-Second Meeting held in Nassau, The Bahamas in July 2001, expressed concern over the new forms of crime and violence that continue to threaten security. This has implications for individual safety and the social and economic well-being of the Region as a whole. It agreed to establish a Regional Task Force on Crime and Security (hereafter referred to as the Task Force), to examine the major causes of crime, and to recommend approaches to deal with inter-related problems, illicit drugs and firearms, as well as terrorism.

The Task Force, chaired by Mr Lancelot Selman of Trinidad and Tobago, comprised representatives from each of the Member States, the Regional Security System (RSS), and the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP). Also participating in the work of the Task Force at its invitation were Professor Ramesh Deosaran, Director – Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of the West Indies, St Augustine and Dr Anthony Harriott Senior Lecturer, Department of Government, Faculty of Social Sciences University of the West Indies, Mona. The Task Force wishes to record its appreciation for the significant contribution of these gentlemen.

Day-to-day coordination was undertaken by a small CARICOM Task Force Secretariat funded by the Government of Trinidad and Tobago, which also funded the administrative arrangements for all meetings of the Task Force.

Five meetings were held between 1 November 2001 and 15 May 2002. Six sub-committees followed up on specific issues via e-mail, teleconferencing, and regular meetings of the Task Force.

Defining the Scope of Work

From the onset, it was necessary for the Task Force to clearly define the parameters of its assignment, which in any case expanded from the original mandate of the Conference of Heads of Governments (July 2001), to examine inter-linkages between crime, drugs and arms; to incorporate tourism, and threats to national and regional security following the 11 September terrorist attack on the United States of America.

The Task Force therefore established its areas of focus as follows-

Understanding the causes of crime that have resulted in escalating fear and panic, with implications for law and order as well as economic prospects, social stability and the general morale of Member States.

- (i) Taking initiatives against activities that pose a direct security threat to the Region having examined the interconnected nature of the newer forms of crime involving illicit drugs and arms, money laundering and tourism proposing policies to meet the challenges facing Member States, and the Region as a whole.

- (ii) Identifying multilateral initiatives against international security in respect of which the Region is committed to participating as co-victims of transnational crime: to build capacity through institutional strengthening, shared surveillance and other forms of co-operation among Member States, and between CARICOM, the wider Caribbean and the international community.

The Task Force remained mindful of the concerns for public safety, making the communities and the streets safer, and reducing fear.

Key Issues: Crime and Security

The key issues are Crime and Security. For purposes of delimiting the scope of work, the Task Force sought to define these issues.

Crime

Crime refers to those acts by individuals, groups and organisations that constitute a breach of the operating rules. It involves the subversion of justice and/or breaking of rules and regulations in several areas – judicial, political, economic, social and individually or collectively.

Defining Security and Crime

The Task Force recognised that security threats, concerns and other challenges in the hemispheric context are multidimensional in nature and scope, and that traditional concepts and approaches must be expanded to address new and non-traditional threats, which include political, economic, social, health, and environmental aspects. It is noted that this approach was endorsed in the Declaration of Bridgetown on the multidimensional approach to Hemispheric Security.

Security

Given the mandate of the Heads of Government, the Task Force confined itself to a definition of security, which, in essence, emphasised governance and public safety. Specifically, the concept referred to a state or condition in which, within the context of a constitutional framework, freedom is enjoyed without fear of victimisation from crime, and in which the functioning of governance by a constitutionally elected Government is not inhibited or disrupted through criminal activity.

The following were identified as the principal security threats -

- i. **Illegal drugs:** spawning a multiplicity of serious criminal activities and social problems, including the involvement of sometimes innocent and vulnerable members of society, in particular, the youth and the poor.
- ii. **Illegal firearms:** the primary instrument of violence and the factor principally responsible for generating fear in societies.

- iii. **Corruption:** the factor most responsible for undermining efforts to address drugs and crime and for the subversion of good governance.
- iv. **Rising crime against persons and property:** the new forms largely linked to illegal drugs and arms.
- v. **Criminal deportees:** a factor of increasingly significant in the escalation of crime and violence.
- vi. **Growing lawlessness:** By way of activity ranging from infractions of the law to actions falling short of classical crime, but amounting to threatening behaviour contributing to fear and affecting the quality of life.
- vii. **Poverty and inequity:** Large numbers of people especially in inner cities and among youth, linked to unemployment and social marginalisation.
- viii. **Terrorism:** A priority area for regional participation in multilateral initiatives against this global threat.

The abovementioned factors, added to the ineffectiveness of the existing criminal justice systems, were considered the principal contributors to the crime problem in the region.

It was determined that, in view of the range of threats to security, policies and programmes needed to be multi-sectoral to be effective. It requires not only the protective services but also the school system, the churches, youth groups and civil society, generally. It requires adherence to laws and other regulations and procedures for reinforcement of the laws and for ensuring that those who enforce the laws are also bound by codes of conduct with rights as well as obligations under the law. It assumes the existence of a high degree of civility and tolerance, linked to moral and ethical codes, as one way to ensure that different cultures and socio-economic groups co-exist under agreed regional and national principles, regulations and shared institutions. One of the major recommendations in this regard is the establishment of national crime commissions, involving representatives from a cross section of State and non-State actors.

The Task Force focused on the urgent need to strengthen the capacity of the law enforcement agencies to control and highlighted the following -

- (i) The need for police reform and the desirability of emphasising Community Crime Prevention and Problem Oriented Policing.
- (ii) An intensive and comprehensive programme geared towards Law Enforcement Training at a regional level
- (iii) Establishment of a Regional Rapid Response Mechanism to provide a prompt specialist response to the need for an investigation in specific Member States.
- (iv) An intelligence and information exchange enhancement scheme to bolster the Region's ability to fight and prevent crime.

- (v) Greater emphasis on the use of technology and research in framing and implementing crime reduction and prevention policies.

Regional response to security threats requires policies that emphasise capacity building and the strengthening of institutional and legal frameworks. In this regard, the Task Force recommended that a model of regional coordination revolves around a regional strategic plan, and incorporates the sub-regional institutional frameworks (CICAD, CCLEC, ACCP and CFATF, etc) into a more viable Pan Caribbean Model. This will function as a coordinating mechanism for sharing and mobilising resources to combat crime, remove threats to security, and function with priorities on prevention. Also, target public education towards groups like youth, inner-city communities, special remedial programmes for young and first offenders, a system of community policing, and resource mobilisation. Other important capacity-building recommendations related to the establishment of a virtual Regional Policy and Research Unit, again building on the resources that currently exist at UWI, for example, and the refining of a criminal justice system for more effective law enforcement action and crime prevention, such as stalking, for which little provision is made in the current judicial system.

The report also examined the proposal of the Prime Minister of Antigua and Barbuda for a regional coordinating entity. It was agreed that this was an essential requirement for taking forward the work of the Task Force and sustaining the regional capacity to develop strategies, programmes and implementing initiatives against crime and security threats.

To this end, the Task Force recommends the establishment of a Caribbean Drug Control and Crime Prevention Commission, comprising either a core group of CARICOM national representatives or a wider group working together in a Pan-Caribbean Partnership similar to that coordinated by CARICOM in response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. This Commission would require substantial secretariat support. It is recommended that this support be provided by any of the following options –

- (i) **Option A:** Establishing a permanent Secretariat from the temporary Secretariat in Trinidad and Tobago, which was created to support the Task Force.
- (ii) **Option B:** Establishing a Secretariat patterned on that which is envisaged to support the Pan-Caribbean Initiative of the HIV/AIDS Programmes. This formulation assumes donor contributions over a period of years.
- (iii) **Option C:** Strengthening the Regional Coordinating Mechanism (RCM) within the CARICOM Secretariat.

Cognisant of the financial constraints within the Region, the Task Force proposes the following approaches offering the best prospects for achieving the expected outcomes from the mandate of Heads of Government, based on short-, medium- and long-term strategies:

1. **Short-term:** Continue the Caribbean Regional Task Force activities for a further period of six months to 31 January 2003, to deal with the outstanding issues, specifically the development of a Regional Strategic Framework to provide cohesion for proposals for funding various components deemed to be urgent priorities.

It would involve drawing on the expertise from within and outside the Region, hence the Task Force in this period will be more focused and specialized. The Regional Strategic Framework would involve further scrutiny of the recommendations in this Report, and would aim at defining the priorities for implementation.

2. **Medium-term/long-term:** Strengthen the Regional Coordinating Mechanism (RCM) within the Secretariat, requiring a marginal increase in professional staff. The RCM would provide effective management and administration of the regional priorities for crime and security that are determined by the appropriate regional authorities, comprising Ministers of Security and/or Attorneys-General. As part of the COHSOD system, it would benefit from the synergies arising from overlapping policy concerns of other Organs of the Community, in particular the COTED, the COFCOR and the Legal Committee. The specific programmes identified in the recommendations would be commissioned to the various regional agencies such as the UWI, ACCP, CICAD, UNDCP (Caribbean), and other competent specialists.
3. Long-term: Establish a Pan Caribbean Partnership for Crime and Drugs. The structure and function of this entity will be evaluated as part of the terms of reference for developing the Regional Strategic Plan, to be carried out by the Task Force in the period July-December 2002.

In the event, the Conference of Heads of Government accepted the recommendation of the joint meeting of Attorneys General and Ministers responsible for National Security, that the regional Task Force be extended for one year – to July 2003. Trinidad and Tobago agreed to continue its funding and other support for the Secretariat and work of the Task Force.

The Regional Strategic Framework for Crime and Security should form the basis of a meeting between CARICOM and the donor Community, with a view to determining specific areas of collaboration and funding of the short and medium priorities of the Framework. At the High-Level Meeting on Drugs and Security in the Caribbean, held in Trinidad and Tobago, December 2001, the donor community expressed interest in partnership with the Region. At that time, it was agreed that CARICOM would prefer to await the Report of the Task Force. This Report, and the proposed follow-up, affords the Region the possibility of meaningful co-operation with external agencies, based on its considered priorities.

Attached is a consolidated summary of recommendations incorporating the recommendations of the Task Force, as well as those proposed by the meeting of the Attorneys General and Ministers responsible for National Security, and the additional priorities issued by the Conference of Heads of Government at its 23rd Session.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

OVERVIEW

The following is a consolidation of all of the recommendations of the Task Force as well as directives from the Twenty-Third Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community and also those proposed by the Joint Meeting of Attorneys General and Ministers with responsibility for National Security.

The report of the Joint Meetings of Attorneys General and Ministers responsible for National Security is attached at **Appendix XI**.

The Task Force addressed four areas, the intention being to mount a multi-sectoral approach to regional security. Under scrutiny were (a) Research (b) Collaboration (c) Strategic Intervention and (d) Financing Strategy.

- (i) The **RESEARCH** concerns are to highlight an evidence-based approach to all areas infringing on crime prevention, and more particularly on matters of policy, legislation, public education and strategic interventions.
- (ii) The **COLLABORATION** focus is that relationship between civil society and government. There's also the desirable networking among non-Government organisations and community based/oriented agencies for their input in policy formulation.
- (ii) The **STRATEGIC INTERVENTIONS** must do with building partnerships for developing an anti-crime culture. It must necessarily concern itself with training, capacity building, advocacy and continuing partnerships.
- (iii) Insofar as **FINANCING STRATEGY** is concerned, the contention is that regional governments must invest in research collaboration and strategic interventions. This approach is the unambiguous demonstration of commitment, which will invite support from regional and international partners.

Below, are a total of 113 recommendations resulting from the deliberations of the Task Force.

CAUSES AND SOURCES OF CRIME

1. **Establish** a regional policy and research unit that would collaborate with the UWI, and other regional institutions with adequate research capabilities.
2. **Take steps** to standardise the recording of data on crime within the Region.
3. **Evaluate** the capabilities of the Government departments responsible for urban planning, with a view to improving their capabilities.
4. **Increase** allocations to drug treatment and education programmes.
5. **Reinforce** anti-corruption measures, including a general strengthening of the systems of accountability.

6. **Strengthen** and **modernize** law enforcement and other criminal justice institutions.

Additional recommendations from the meeting of Attorneys General and Ministers with responsibility for National Security.

7. **Conduct** further scientific investigation with a view to arriving at a clearer understanding of the values that underlie the social choices that lead to criminal behaviour
8. **Ascertain** the types of societal values which should be encouraged bearing in mind that any programme which is implemented will carry a time lag of approximately 10 years before behaviour changes become apparent;

ILLEGAL DRUGS

9. **Identify** the regional priorities and strategies for drug control and crime prevention.
10. **Develop** and **strengthen** mechanisms for implementation and coordination at the national, regional and international levels.
11. **Establish** appropriate legislative and administrative mechanisms to facilitate intra- and inter- regional cooperation.
12. **Strengthen** the Regional Coordinating Mechanism for Drug Control within CARICOM Secretariat.
13. **Pursue** judicial system reform to enable non-custodial penalties, sentencing guidelines and expeditious trials.
14. **Sign and ratify** Regional Maritime Cooperation Agreement to enable more effective Maritime Interdiction.
15. **Enhance** border control and port security systems and measures, **to reduce import and export of illegal drugs.**
16. **Strengthen** Intelligence and Information Exchange capacity. *See No. 14 under Country Initiatives Against Crime (To be presented under separate cover)*
17. **Pursue** enhanced Law Enforcement capacity to address illegal drug supply interdiction and investigation.
18. **Develop** Demand Reduction Programmes as approved by the Thirteenth Inter-Session Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government in Belize in February 2002.
19. **Continue** anti money laundering capacity-building initiatives as currently delivered through the CFATF and CALP, and which now extend to Terrorist Financing.
20. **Pursue** a consolidated Pan Caribbean Partnership to **engage** the wider Caribbean in dialogue and discussion on crafting a way forward, in implementing action against Drugs and Crime.

21. **Take steps** to pursue closer collaboration with USA, UK, Canada, the French and Dutch Territories, and Central and South America.
22. **Pursue** more active participation in international organisations such as UNDCP and OAS/CICAD in order to increase opportunities for technical support.
23. **Participate** more actively in the process of the OAS/CICAD multilateral evaluation process (MEM).
24. **Pursue** the creation of Alternative Sustainable Livelihoods for populations at risk.

Directives from the Conference of Heads of Government

25. **Engagement** of the International Community in discussions regarding mutual support for our crime control efforts and a critical review of the existing policy against illegal drugs.

Additional recommendations from the meeting of Attorneys General and Ministers with responsibility for National Security.

26. **Urgently establish** a mechanism to facilitate dialogue at the national and regional levels on the issue of attacks on the Rule of Law arising particularly from the continued inclusion of laws which societal attitudes render virtually unenforceable
27. **Treat** drug abuse primarily as a public health issue with emphasis on the reinforcement of values.

ILLEGAL FIREARMS

The recommendations are categorized into national, regional and international initiatives as follows -

National

28. **Adopt** and operationalise by statute, the UN Protocol on the Illicit Trafficking in Firearms and the OAS Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and other Related Materials.
29. **Consider** the implementation of national programmes aimed at taking firearms off the street. The following key elements are suggested -
 - (a) **Establish** dedicated firearms interdiction units.
 - (b) **Conduct** aggressive intelligence operations aimed at identifying illegal firearm-trafficking firearm hirers.
 - (c) **Augment** covert intelligence with other initiatives, such as crime-stoppers programmes.
 - (d) **Employ** coastal surveillance by marine law enforcement.

- (e) **Increase** intelligence assets in remote coastal areas.
- (f) **Enhance** airport and seaport security, targeting firearm imports
- (g) **Review** legal and administrative regimes for the issue of firearms licenses to reduce the risk of legal firearms being diverted into criminal use.
- 30. **Access** appropriate training and equipment to enhance Customs' capacity to identify and interdict illegal firearms at ports of entry (See 39 f) above).
- 31. **Encourage** use of new Regional Search Training Center in Jamaica together with the provision of appropriate equipment at the national levels,
- 32. **Pursue** cooperative arrangements with "source countries," to assist with the training and equipment needs to effectively tackle the inseparable drug and firearms trade.
- 33. **Develop and implement** national education programs, simulating existing Drug Control Demand Reduction Programs. (Schools to be targeted).

Regional

- 34. **Mandate** the ACCP to -
 - (a) **Collate** statistics on firearm-related offences within the Region;
 - (b) **Identify** and keep abreast of trends relating to the importation, exportation, and concealment methods utilized in the illicit firearms trade, and in so doing, develop and maintain a *modus operandi* database;
- 35. **Include** illegal firearms among the target areas of the Regional Intelligence and Information Exchange Project.
- 36. **Negotiate** with source countries for stricter monitoring and recording of secondary sales, and domestic sales of ammunition.
- 37. **Ensure** integration of existing Regional Intelligence Mechanisms (OCTRIS, ROCISS, RCS, etc.), to facilitate real time exchange of information on firearm-related matters.
- 38. **Enhance** the Region's capacity to monitor arms and ammunition trade by bona fide manufacturers and dealers.
- 39. **Develop** Intra-Regional type Ship-rider and other agreements between Member States, to facilitate an appropriate marine response.
- 40. **Complete** urgently a Regional approach to Justice protection, to maximize successful investigation and prosecution of firearm offences.
- 41. **Provide** adequate funding for ACCP to allow it to fulfill its mandate.

International

42. **Review** applications for licenses to export, import and transit of small arms and light weapons, in the light of the domestic legislation of the exporting, importing or transit states.
43. **Support** be given to the marking of firearms, improved regulation of firearms dealers, the strengthening of national record-keeping requirements and the application of more rigorous standards for arms brokers and other traders of small arms and light weapons.
44. **Pursue** dialogue with the international community aimed at urging the implementation of measures that would limit the production of weapons to levels that meet the need for defence and national security, and would limit civilian access to weapons manufactured for military use.

TERRORISM - COUNTER-TERRORIST PLAN OF ACTION

45. **Improve** Border Control Measures and Port Security in order to limit and monitor the movement and activities of Terrorist elements within the Region;
46. **Establish** a regime of DOMESTIC security measures with the aimed to -
 - a. **Improve** security at key points and critical infrastructure;
 - b. **Effect** more efficient management of intelligence;
 - c. By public education **keep** the public current of the terrorist threat, and reduce opportunities for corruption of the youth by the terrorist elements;
 - d. **Introduce** contingency planning for response to terrorist incidents;
47. **Legislate** to enable implementation of international conventions on terrorism and terrorist financing;
48. **Expand** and **enhance** the regional intelligence and information exchange mechanisms, for shared use to include intelligence and information on terrorism.

THE IMPACT OF DEPORTEES ON CRIME AND SECURITY

49. **Consider** the establishment of Offices for the Resettlement of Deportees as modeled by St. Kitts and Nevis and informed by the experience of Haiti, with functions to include:
 - a) determining the work record of the deportee with a view to helping him or her find at least short term employment;
 - b) creating a half way house(s) as an extension of the Resettlement Office;
 - c) instituting appropriate programmes to deal/treat with deportees, depending on the offences committed.
50. **Strengthen** the regional exchange of information on deportees through the RIU. Consider introducing domestic legislation that allows for the monitoring of deportees consistent with the existing constitutional rights of all citizens;
51. **Pursue** a more in-depth and ongoing study of the criminal deportee phenomenon.

Additional recommendations from the meeting of Attorneys General and Ministers with responsibility for National Security.

- 52. Member States **collaborate** more closely with and among each other with a view to making greater use of their missions in foreign Capitals.
- 53. **Collaboration** with the OAS/CICAD, which has ongoing initiatives in this area.

CRIME REDUCTION STRATEGIES

Planning

- 54. **Develop** National Crime Control Master Plans that would integrate law enforcement, social crime prevention, legal issues and regional and international cooperation;
- 55. **Establish** National Crime Commissions with appropriate secretariats to drive implementation of the Crime Control Master;

Directives from the Conference of Heads of Government

- 56. Develop a regional initiative against Youth Crime.

Institutional Strengthening

- 57. **Modernize** the Criminal Justice Systems. The CTF was primarily concerned with police and prison reform;

Emphasizing the Use of Technology

- 58. **Improve** technology to deal with passport fraud essentially, in view of the increased use of the Caribbean as a drug transshipment point, and the threat from tourism;
- 59. **Give priority** to sourcing the necessary equipment for the building, and/or strengthening of regional databases.
- 60. **Improve** the local databases of Member States;
- 61. **Establish** NJHQs with databases in 12 Member States.
- 62. **Establish** a database to improve information and intelligence sharing capabilities (amplified in separate report on Information and Intelligence exchange).

Improving Training

- 63. **Establish** a Regional Training Coordinating Group (RTCG) to look at training needs and examine capacity of institutions/ territories and pursue the proposal for expanding and carrying forward the Regional Drug Law Enforcement Programme.
- 64. **Maximize** the use of the new Regional (firearm) Search Training Centre in Jamaica;

Application of Effective Management Tools and Strengthening Accountability

- 65. **Set common standards** for policing in the Region.
- 66. **Establish** Parliamentary Oversight Committees to oversee law enforcement;

Modernising Police–Citizen Relations

- 67. **Support strongly** the implementation of a model of Community policing advocated by the ACCP, (launched in May 2001).

Reform of the Correctional Services

- 68. States **initiate** steps towards appropriate policies for reform and modernization of prisons, in order to reduce the rate of recidivism.
- 69. **Examine** alternatives to imprisonment.

Additional recommendations from the meeting of Attorneys General and Ministers with responsibility for National Security.

- 70. **Include** tertiary level training component in law enforcement and related disciplines at regional institutions
- 71. **Develop** of effective information networks for the criminal justice system
- 72. **Increase** the attraction of policing as a profession by upgrading the remuneration packages
- 73. **Introduce** police cadet schemes in schools and community-based policy and problem oriented programmes.

STRUCTURAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Regional Authority For Crime Prevention And Counter Drug Strategy

- 74. **Provide** substantial secretarial support for the proposed Caribbean Drug Control and Crime Prevention Commission (CDCCP), including the following options:

- (a) **Option A:** Establish a permanent Secretariat from the temporary Secretariat in Trinidad and Tobago, which was created to support the Task Force.
 - (b) **Option B:** Establish a Secretariat patterned on that which was envisaged to support the Pan-Caribbean Initiative of the HIV/AIDS Programme.
 - (c) **Option C:** Strengthen the Regional Coordinating Mechanism (RCM) within the CARICOM Secretariat.
75. It is considered that the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP) be incorporated into the existing CARICOM structure and report to the relevant body.

Regional Rapid Response Unit

76. **Establish** in the first instance, a Regional Rapid Response Mechanism.

High Security Prison(s)

77. **Determine** the feasibility of the proposal from Antigua and Barbuda on the basis of an in-depth expert study that would examine some of the outstanding questions.

Legal Framework

Delays in the Administration of Justice

- 78. **Provide** further training of court officials;
- 79. **Share** information on “best practices” in the Region;
- 80. **Use** drug courts and night courts to expedite hearing of drug-related matters;
- 81. **Amend** the criteria for bail;
- 82. **Expand** the scope of existing regional Administration of Justice programmes to all countries; and
- 83. **Develop** uniform sentencing guidelines.

Training

- 84. **Take** advantage of training opportunities in anti-money laundering as provided by CALP, CFATF and bilateral programmes; and
- 85. **Train** public officials and the private sector in the implementation of Conventions.

Implementation of Legislation

- 86. **Mobilise** resources to create institutional capacity for the implementation of legislation;

- 87. **Source** technical assistance;
- 88. Ensure **the constitutional validity of legislation in respect of the freezing and confiscation of assets**;
- 89. **Legislate** to permit the admissibility of criminal records from other jurisdictions;
- 90. **Draft legislation** on precursors; and
- 91. **Enact** laws and mechanisms for sentencing alternatives

Regional and International Cooperation

- 92. **Become** parties, to and implement the relevant international instruments;
- 93. **Focus** on multi-agency collaboration and capacity-building in the area of asset forfeiture;
- 94. **Sign and ratify** the Regional Maritime Cooperation Agreement;
- 95. **Seek** to attain the minimum international requirements with respect to anti-money laundering cooperation;
- 96. **Operationalise** the Regional Justice Protection Programme and focus on deepening cooperation with major stakeholders, particularly at the international level;
- 97. **Consider** the possibility of transferring proceedings for criminal prosecution of offences in cases where such transfer is considered to be in the interests of the proper administration of justice;
- 98. **Adopt** a Regional Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty as a matter of urgency;
- 99. **Consider** the implementation of a Regional Prison Transfer Agreement;
- 100. **Establish** an intra-regional extradition regime;
- 101. **Consider** becoming parties to the OAS Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty;
- 102. **Draft** appropriate protocols to improve risk profiling, and detention of suspicious persons at sea ports and airports within the Region;
- 103. **Initiate** discussions with firearm manufacturing and exporting countries, with a view to developing an MOU in respect of the exportation of illegal firearms;
 - a. **Ratify** the Inter-American Firearms Convention and the UN Protocol Firearms;
- 104. **Review** legislation and regulations in the issuance of firearms;
- 105. **Sign and ratify** the OAS Convention Against Terrorism.

CAPACITY BUILDING

Maritime Cooperation (Regional Maritime Counter Drug Strategy)

106. Convene a meeting of Regional Maritime Law Enforcement Officials from the US, UK, Overseas Territories, The Netherlands Antilles, Overseas French Departments, Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico and CARICOM to review the proposed structure and agree on the organization and mechanisms for operationalising the maritime cooperation framework for the wider Caribbean, paying particular attention to the following:
- (a) Coordination of maritime activities in the Southern Caribbean by Trinidad and Tobago.
 - (b) Coordination of maritime activities in the entire Eastern Caribbean by (RSS)-Barbados in collaboration with the Maritime Coordination Centre in Martinique (*This recommendation was endorsed by the High Level Meeting*)
107. **Establish** a National Law Enforcement Committees (NADLEC), comprising Heads of Law Enforcement Agencies, to coordinate all joint law enforcement activities;
108. **Effect** an early conclusion of negotiations of the Regional Maritime Agreement.
109. **Ensure** that the Regional Coordinating Mechanism within the CARICOM Secretariat be strengthened with additional human and financial resources.

Directives from the Conference of Heads of Government

110. **Engaging** the international community on the question of possible support in the implementation of the recommendations of the Task Force.

Law Enforcement Training

111. **Support** the police reform process through the ACCP Community Policing Programme initiative, in collaboration with RCMP and with support from the Canadian Government, to achieve effective quality service delivery
112. **Ensure** that the Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) have established –
- a) An identified individual, section or department with specific or general responsibility for issues relating to training;
 - b) A clear system for identifying and prioritizing their law enforcement training needs;
 - c) A simple training plan, identifying the key areas targeted for securing training;
 - d) A policy for identifying and selecting the most appropriate individuals to undergo particular training;

- e) A mechanism for constantly reviewing and revising their training needs on a regular basis

113. **Work** together, combining resources through collaborative co-operation of:

- a) The Political will;
- b) Political financial support for the ACCP Secretariat;
- c) Political and financial support for the RTCG;
- d) Support for the implementation of the several recommendations of the ACCP/DFID
- e) Review of Police Training in the Caribbean